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I. INTRODUCTION 
	  
In 1996, former Justice David Souter famously declared, “I can tell you the 
day you see a camera come into our courtroom, it’s going to roll over my dead 
body.”1 In the eighteen years since Justice Souter’s statement, technology has 
evolved at an unprecedented rate. Cameras are now allowed in nearly all state 
courtrooms2 as well as some federal courts.3 Other technologies, such as smart- 
phones, iPads, and even Twitter are following suit.4 However, as the use of 
technology in court increases, so do the risks. 
A few days after a Cleveland woman witnessed a fatal shooting, the gun- 
man’s friends found her and threatened her not to testify against him.5 The 
friends called her a “snitch,” said that there was a price on her head, and posted 
comments about her on Facebook.6 Fearing for her life, the woman reported the 
man to the police, who arrested and charged him with witness intimidation and 
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1 On Cameras in Supreme Court, Souter Says, ‘Over My Dead Body’, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 30, 1996, at 24 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
2 JUDICIAL COUNCIL STUDY COMM., UTAH STATE COURTS, FINAL REPORT: TECHNOLOGY 
BROUGHT  INTO  THE  COURTROOM  6  (2012)  [hereinafter  TECHNOLOGY  BROUGHT  INTO  THE 
COURTROOM], available at http://commcns.org/1nRFpu0. 
3 Id. at 10. 
4 Steve Zansberg & Janna Fischer, Portable Electronic Devices in the Courtroom 2 & 
n.6 (2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://commcns.org/T2PBo9. 
5 Kevin Davis, Witness Harassment Has Gone Digital, and the Justice System Is Play- 
ing Catch-Up, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 1, 2013, 3:40 AM), http://commcns.org/1kXNA6Q. 
6 Id. 
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retaliation.7 He pled guilty and was sentenced to two years in prison.8 This 
example and those that follow illustrate one of the most significant issues with 
new technology: the growing problem of witness intimidation, which has 
evolved from physical and verbal threats to include more sophisticated, indi- 
rect forms of digital harassment.9 
In a recent U.S. District Court case, a white supremacist was sentenced to 42 
months in prison for stalking and threatening a federal juror.10 In a 2008 tirade 
on his website,11 the defendant labeled the juror a “gay Jewish anti-racist” and 
made references to the juror’s long-term partner.12 The defendant also posted 
detailed information about the juror on the website, including the juror’s color 
photo, address, phone number, and even the name of his cat.13 And in yet an- 
other case, an anonymous social media user named “rats215” posted photo- 
graphs, police statements, and testimony of more than thirty witnesses to vio- 
lent crimes across Philadelphia since February 2013.14 The frequently updated 
“rats215” account drew nearly 7,900 eager followers, who publicly “liked” and 
responded to the postings.15 “Post some new rats,” a commenter wrote in Sep- 
tember. “I needa put a hit out on them.”16 
These cases all demonstrate the same growing problem: digital witness 
intimidation is on the rise both inside and outside of the courtroom. As the 
issue continues to evolve, prosecutors and courts must address it. While 
witness intimidation is not a new phenomenon, certain methods are relatively 
new. In the past, threats 
	  
	  
	  
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 James Staas, Man Convicted of Witness Intimidation after Grand Jury Testimony Is 
Posted on Facebook, BUFF. NEWS (Oct. 30, 2013, 2:38 PM), http://commcns.org/1kXNxYI 
(“[W]itness intimidation has entered the age of social media.”). 
10 U.S. Attorney’s Office, Press Release, White Supremacist William White Sentenced 
to 42 Months in Prison for Soliciting Violence Against Hale Jury Foreman (Feb. 20, 2013), 
http://commcns.org/1iHhZCa. 
11 William A. White, the white supremacist, posted the following on his website: “Gay 
Jewish anti-racist [Hale Juror A] was a juror who played a key role in convicting Matt Hale. 
Born [date], [he/she] lives at [address] with [his/her] gay black lover and [his/her] cat 
[name]. [His/Her] phone number is [phone number], cell phone [phone number], and 
[his/her] office is [phone number].” Criminal Complaint at 6, United States v. White, No. 
08-CR-851 (Oct. 17, 2008) [hereinafter Criminal Complaint], available at 
http://commcns.org/1pIdWuc. 
12 Pierre Waithe, White Supremacist Sentenced for Threatening Federal Juror, DIGITAL 
J. (Feb. 25, 2013), http://commcns.org/1nRFJZE. 
13 Criminal Complaint, supra note 11, at 6. 
14 Jam Kotenko, Instagram Account Intimidating Witness Shut Down, Instigates Cell- 
phone Ban in Courts, DIGITAL TRENDS (Nov. 12, 2013), http://commcns.org/1rwkOPN. 
15 Philadelphia Police Find Online List of Witnesses, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2013, at 24. 
16 Id. 
   	  
	  
	  
	  
were waged either face-to-face, over the phone, or through letters.17 Now, 
through modern technology, there are a myriad of new ways to harass indi- 
viduals on the Internet through posts, status updates, and tweets. Witnesses 
who are victims or eyewitnesses of violent crimes, law enforcement officers, or 
codefendants who cooperate with the prosecution are particularly at risk. Digi- 
tal witness intimidation differs from face-to-face threats because a photo, re- 
cording, or online post can be instantly sent, viewed by a mass audience, and 
then readily destroyed. This creates problems for judges and attorneys alike, as 
evidence can be difficult to obtain and tie to a particular suspect. 
This Comment advocates for a uniform set of rules that expressly 1) clarifies 
the types of devices that will be permitted in courtrooms, 2) specifies the 
acceptable uses of such devices, 3) defines terms such as “broadcast” and 
“reporter” to avoid ambiguity, and 4) creates procedures for rule enforcement, 
broadcasting requests, pool arrangements, and other logistical concerns. Part 
II provides a historical overview of the media and public’s right of access and 
use of technology in court. It summarizes the conflicting case law and tra- 
ditional arguments on both sides of the debate about whether such technology 
should be permitted. This analysis includes the inherent difficulties faced by 
judges in their determination of whether to allow technology in their court- 
rooms. Judges must weigh a variety of competing factors, including the defen- 
dant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair and public trial,18 the press and public’s 
First Amendment right to observe trials,19 and the right of all parties to “dig- 
nity, order, and decorum” in “all court proceedings.”20 Part III investigates state 
experimentation with cameras in court, and discusses current federal and state 
policies regarding cameras in court. Part IV explores recent case law in order 
to examine the major problems being posed by the use of smartphones, lap- 
tops, and social media. Part V uses three federal cases to illustrate the ambigu- 
ity of current electronic media policies, and to advocate for a uniform set of 
rules. Part VI evaluates Utah and Kansas’ recently amended electronic media 
laws and offers suggestions for improvement. Finally, this Comment concludes 
with an advisory to legislatures seeking to revise their electronic media rules. 
	  
	  
	  
	  
17 Staas, supra note 9. 
18 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial . . . .”). 
19 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 & n.17 (1980) (recogniz- 
ing a presumptive right to attend criminal trials). 
20 Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970) (“It is essential to the proper administra- 
tion of criminal justice that dignity, order, and decorum be the hallmarks of all court pro- 
ceedings in our country. The flagrant disregard in the courtroom of elementary standards of 
proper conduct should not and cannot be tolerated.”). 
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II. HISTORICAL AND CURRENT TECHNOLOGY USE IN COURT BY 
THE PUBLIC AND MEDIA 
	  
The history of technology in the courtroom by the public and media is sto- 
ried and complex. Debates over whether technology should be allowed in court 
have persisted for years, resulting in confusing and contradictory case law. The 
rise of modern media, the dramatic increase of social media usage, and the pro- 
liferation of small, handheld devices, have created new and unexpected prob- 
lems both in and out of the courtroom.21 To ameliorate confusion, it is neces- 
sary to examine how the former judicial rules of access and technology use in 
court (which were largely written to address the media’s use of television cam- 
eras and other recording devices22) apply to the technologies of today. 
	  
A. First Amendment Right of Access in Courtrooms 
	  
1. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia (1980): The Court Asserts the 
Right of the Public to Attend Criminal Trials 
	  
Members of the press and public enjoy expansive freedom to observe and 
report on judicial proceedings.23 In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, the 
Supreme Court held that the public had implicit First and Fourteenth Amend- 
ment rights to attend criminal trials.24 The Court explained that unless a trial 
court found an overriding interest and included it on the record, criminal trials 
were open to the public.25 In addition, the Court said that a trial judge should 
explore alternative solutions that preserve fairness before excluding the media 
and public from the courtroom.26 
The Majority based its conclusion on four key factors. First, the Court 
looked to the long history of public criminal trials in the Anglo-American jus- 
	  
	  
21 Cathy Packer, Should Courtroom Observers Be Allowed to Use Their Smartphones 
and Computers in Court? An Examination of the Arguments, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 573, 
583–84 (2013). For example, as Packer observes, some judges have taken the view that 
smartphones are the functional equivalents of televisions and prohibit smartphones by using 
the same arguments that justify the ban on television cameras. Id. at 584. 
22 Id. at 574. 
23 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 577–78 (1980). It is important 
to note that, as Justice Brennan observed, there is a distinction between the public and the 
media’s right of access; regardless, “the media’s right of access is at least equal to that of the 
general public.” Id. at 586 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
24 Id. at 580. 
25 Id. at 581. 
26 Id. at 580–81. Alternate solutions to excluding the media include changes of venue, 
jury sequestration, and in camera hearings. Id. at 600 n.4 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
   	  
	  
	  
	  
tice system, spanning from open trials in England since before the Norman 
Conquest and in the United States, since colonial times.27 Throughout this vast 
time span and “although great changes in courts and procedure took place,” 
there was “one thing [that] remained constant,” the Richmond Court observed, 
and that was “the public character of the trial at which guilt or innocence was 
decided.”28 
Second, citing Matthew Hale and William Blackstone, Chief Justice Burger 
(writing for the majority in Richmond Newspapers) stated that open trials help 
ensure fair proceedings for all parties involved.29 More specifically, Chief Jus- 
tice Burger noted that access to criminal trials reduces perjury, misconduct, 
and biased decisions.30 Burger also explained that public access serves as an 
important check on the other branches of government, assures the public that 
procedural rights are respected, and upholds public confidence in the judicial 
process.31 
Third, the Majority recognized the significant therapeutic value of public 
trials.32 In the wake of shocking crime, the court provides an important outlet 
for a community’s outrage, frustration, and need for retribution.33 Chief Justice 
Burger summarized by stating, “To work effectively, it is important that soci- 
ety’s criminal process satisfy the appearance of justice . . . and the appearance 
of justice can best be provided by allowing people to observe it.”34 In other 
words, the public naturally wants to see justice being served, and they will not 
be satisfied unless they observe both the judicial process and its results.35 To 
aid in the “community catharsis” after a disturbing crime and to maintain pub- 
lic confidence, the Court believed that it was imperative that trials be transpar- 
ent and open to the public.36 
Finally, the Court recognized the educational value of allowing a criminal 
trial to be conducted in the open.37 Public trials allow citizens to learn not only 
about the facts of a particular case, but also about the legal system in general.38 
This increased understanding helps to build public confidence that justice is 
	  
	  
	  
27     Id. at 564–69. 
28 Id. at 566. 
29 Id. at 569. 
30 Id. 
31     Id. at 571–72. 
32     Id. at 570–71. 
33 Id. at 571. 
34 Id. at 571–72 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 572. 
38 Id. 
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being served.39 The Court reasoned that members of the media function as sur- 
rogates for the public, because most people acquire information primarily 
through print and electronic media.40 Further, the Court acknowledged that the 
media has the same right of access as the public, contributes to public un- 
derstanding of the law, and adds to the overall integrity of criminal proceed- 
ings.41 Although technology has rapidly evolved since Richmond v. Newspa- 
pers, the arguments used by the Majority remain central to the debate over 
technology today. 
	  
2. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California II (1986): The Court 
Coins the “Experience and Logic” Test 
	  
Six years after Richmond Newspapers, the Court expanded the right of ac- 
cess and developed the “Experience and Logic Test,” used to determine 
whether a judicial proceeding should be open to the public.42 In Press- 
Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, the Supreme Court held that 
the right of access to criminal proceedings extends to preliminary hearings.43 
The case involved a nurse charged with murdering twelve patients by injecting 
them with lethal doses of the heart drug lidocaine.44 The judge granted the de- 
fendant’s motion to bar the public from the preliminary hearing under a Cali- 
fornia statute that required proceedings to be open unless “exclusion of the 
public is necessary in order to protect the defendant’s right to a fair and impar- 
tial trial.”45 Subsequently, California and Press-Enterprise Co. sought to have 
the preliminary hearing transcript released.46 The California Supreme Court 
held that there was no general First Amendment right of access to preliminary 
hearings and denied the request to release the transcript; and the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to address the issue.47 
To answer the question, the Court articulated the two-part “Experience 
and Logic Test,” which is still used by courts today to determine whether 
the judicial proceedings must be open.48 The experience prong of the test 
focuses on “whether the place and process have historically been open to the 
press and 
	  
39 Id. 
40     Id. at 572–73. 
41 Id. at 573. 
42 Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of California (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 9 
(1986). 
43 Id. at 13. 
44 Id. at 3. 
45 Id. at 3–4 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
46 Id. at 4–5. 
47 Id. at 5–6. 
48 Id. at 9. 
   	  
	  
	  
	  
general public.”49 The logic prong examines “whether public access plays a 
significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in ques- 
tion.”50 The Court reasoned that if a particular proceeding passes both the expe- 
rience and logic prongs, a First Amendment right of access attaches.51 How- 
ever, the Court also qualified the test by asserting that a right of access is not 
absolute, and under limited circumstances, particularly if a defendant’s right to 
a fair trial is compromised, closure may be warranted.52 
Under Press Enterprise II, to close the trial to the public and media, the 
judge must find: first, there is a “substantial probability” that publicity will 
prejudice the defendant’s right to a fair trial; and, second, there is no reason- 
able alternative to closure.53 Closure, in other words, must be an option of last 
resort, which is essential and narrowly tailored.54 
	  
B. Cameras in the Courtroom 
	  
1. Estes v. State of Texas: The Court Addresses the Impact of Cameras in 
Court 
	  
During the 1930s, the Supreme Court reversed convictions of several high- 
profile defendants after finding that cameras had “physically and psychologi- 
cally” disrupted the proceedings.55 In the Supreme Court’s first major case on 
television cameras in the courtroom, Estes v. Texas, the sharply divided Court 
relied on similar arguments to reverse a man’s swindling conviction.56 The 
courtroom found that the circus-like atmosphere created by the media im- 
pinged on the defendant’s right to a fair trial.57 The room was filled to capacity 
with newspaper reporters, cameramen, and spectators, with thirty or more peo- 
ple crowding the aisles.58 
	  
49 Id. at 8. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 9. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 14. 
54     Id. at 13–14. 
55 Packer, supra note 21, at 578. 
56 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 534–36 (1965). In Estes, four Justices concluded that 
the presence of television cameras made it impossible to have a fair trial and, therefore, 
were per se prejudicial. See Constitutional Law: Sixth Amendment, Televising Trials, 15 
AKRON L. REV. 183, 185 (1982). Four Justices rejected the per se rule. Id. Justice Harlan 
was the deciding vote; he concluded that the defendant’s due process rights were violated, 
but he disagreed that television cameras were per se prejudicial. Id. 
57 Estes, 381 U.S. at 536. 
58 Id. at 552–53 (Warren, C.J., concurring). 
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An article in the New York Times described the pandemonium as follows: 
A television motor van, big as an intercontinental bus, was parked outside 
the courthouse and the second-floor courtroom was a forest of equipment. Two 
television cameras had been set up inside the bar and four more marked cam- 
eras were aligned just outside the gates. 
A microphone stuck its 12-inch snout inside the jury box, now occupied by 
an overflow of reporters from the press table, and three microphones con- 
fronted [the trial judge] on his bench. Tables and wires snaked over the floor.59 
The Estes Court said that the use of television in court does not contribute to 
the judicial objective of ascertaining truth and claimed that its use injected an 
“irrelevant factor into court proceedings.”60 The Estes Court went on to illus- 
trate four primary concerns over the use of cameras in court. First, the Court 
said that the intense publicity surrounding a trial could pressure the jury to ren- 
der a verdict that comports with the popular opinion or unduly distracts jurors 
during trial.61 Second, the Court was concerned that televised proceedings 
would affect the quality and accuracy of testimony.62 The witness’s knowledge 
that he or she is in front of a national audience may cause them to be fright- 
ened, arrogant, or melodramatic.63 Furthermore, the fear of appearing on 
camera could make certain witnesses reluctant to testify.64 Third, trial judges 
would be burdened by having to ensure both the fairness of the proceedings 
and manage the presence of cameras and reporters.65 In Estes, for example, the 
cameras’ presence forced the trial judge to conduct hearings and to enter orders 
that were otherwise unnecessary.66 If one trial were televised, the Estes Court 
reasoned, then the media would put great pressure on other elected judges to 
also televise their proceedings.67 
Finally, the Court worried about the effect of television on defendants.68 
Televising a defendant resembled a “police line-up in the third degree” and had 
the potential to violate the defendant’s values, dignity, and focus on the trial.69 
Continuing, the Estes Court said, “A defendant on trial for a specific crime is 
	  
	  
59 Homer Bigart, Estes Goes on Trial in Texas with TV in Courtroom, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
25, 1962, at 1, 46. Chief Justice Warren cited this passage in his concurrence with the Estes 
majority. Estes, 381 U.S. at 553 (Warren, C.J., concurring). 
60 Estes, 381 U.S. at 544. 
61     Id. at 545–46. 
62 Id. at 547. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 548. 
66 Id. 
67     Id. at 548–49. 
68 Id. at 549. 
69 Id. 
   	  
	  
	  
	  
entitled to his day in court, not in a stadium, or a city or nationwide arena. The 
heightened public clamor resulting from radio and television coverage will 
inevitably result in prejudice.”70 Cognizant of the pace of technological devel- 
opment and the possibility that broadcasting might become less disruptive in 
trials, the Estes Court tailored its holding narrowly to apply to the effect of 
television on trials as the technology existed at that time.71 Although technol- 
ogy has become less invasive since Estes, courts remain divided over its im- 
pact on trial participants. 
	  
2. Chandler v. Florida: States Begin to Experiment with Cameras in Court 
	  
In 1981, the Supreme Court departed from the Estes rule through its holding 
in Chandler v. Florida. The Chandler Court held that allowing cameras in the 
courtroom was not an automatic violation of a criminal defendant’s Fourteenth 
Amendment right to a fair trial.72 In Chandler, the appellants, Miami Beach 
policemen at the time of arrest, were charged with conspiracy to commit bur- 
glary and grand larceny.73 The State’s principal witness was a novice radio op- 
erator, who had inadvertently recorded conversations between the appellants 
over their police radios during the burglary.74 The case was a media sensation.75 
The appellants were convicted by a jury and objected to the televising of the 
trial, claiming that it was neither fair nor impartial.76 The Supreme Court noted 
that the appellants-defendants had failed to show that the broadcast coverage 
had actually prejudiced the trial.77 The Chandler Court reasoned that, under 
Estes, there was no absolute prohibition against televising the proceedings, 
thus, Florida was not prohibited from “experimenting” with cameras in the 
courtroom.78 Citing federalism concerns, the Chandler Court left open the door 
for state courts to experiment with allowing cameras in their courtrooms.79 
	  
III. CURRENT POLICIES REGARDING CAMERAS IN 
COURT 
	  
A. State Policies 
	  
70 Id. 
71     Id. at 551–52. 
72     Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 573 (1981). 
73 Id. at 567. The crimes arose from the officers’ breaking and entering into a popular 
Miami Beach restaurant. Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 568. 
77 Id. at 579. 
78     Id. at 573–74. 
79     Id. at 577, 580. 
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From the 1970s through the 1990s, many state courts experimented with 
changing their court rules to expand electronic media coverage of judicial pro- 
ceedings.80 The vast majority of these rules have now been made permanent.81 
With the exception of the District of Columbia, all states allow some camera 
coverage of their trial or appellate courts.82 State rules permitting digital broad- 
casting differ significantly in their approach and methodology.83 Limits on 
coverage can be categorized, generally, by the type of court, proceeding, and 
consent (or lack thereof) by the parties.84 
Some states have created a presumption that electronic media coverage is al- 
lowed in proceedings that are accessible to the public.85 Limiting coverage re- 
quires a consideration of factors such as the right to a fair trial, privacy con- 
cerns, and safety interests.86 Other states “expressly prohibit electronic media 
coverage of certain proceedings, witnesses, or trial participants, such as juve- 
niles, sexual-assault victims, and jurors.”87 In lieu of explicit prohibitions, other 
states give the judge broad discretion to limit coverage to protect the fairness 
and safety of the proceedings.88 
The Radio Television Digital News Association (“RTDNA”)89 maintains a 
state-by-state guidebook of camera coverage allowed in state courts.90 Accord- 
ing to the RTDNA, electronic media restrictions generally fall into three “tiers” 
of restrictiveness.91 Tier 1 states, of which there are nineteen, allow the most 
electronic media coverage in state courtrooms.92 Tier 2 states have rules that 
prohibit coverage of certain types of cases or proceedings, or that prohibit 
coverage of most or all categories of witnesses who object to coverage.93  
Finally, 
	  
80 TECHNOLOGY BROUGHT INTO THE COURTROOM, supra note 2, at 6. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 6–7. 
85 Id. at 7. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 About    RTDNA    and    RTDNF,    RADIO     TELEVISION     DIGITAL     NEWS     ASS’N, 
http://commcns.org/1kvuyQy (last visited Feb. 18, 2014) (“Founded as a grassroots organi- 
zation . . . RTDNA works to protect the rights of electronic journalists in the courts and 
legislatures throughout the country . . . .”). 
90 See Cameras in the Court: A State-by-State Guide, RADIO TELEVISION DIGITAL NEWS 
ASS’N, http://commcns.org/1gRJNsk (last visited May 31, 2014). 
91 TECHNOLOGY BROUGHT INTO THE COURTROOM, supra note 2, at 7–8. 
92 Id. at 7. Those nineteen states are: California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, 
Kentucky, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyo- 
ming. Id. 
93 Id. at 7–8. The sixteen Tier 2 States are: Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Hawaii, Indi- 
   	  
	  
	  
	  
fifteen Tier 3 states only permit appellate coverage or have such restrictive 
coverage rules that coverage is virtually banned.94 
	  
B. Federal Policies 
	  
Federal courts have been more reluctant to change due to the language of 
Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibiting photography 
and broadcasting in the courtroom.95 Currently, cameras are allowed only in the 
Second and Ninth Circuits, which amended their rules and guidelines to allow 
for electronic media coverage.96 In addition, there have been federal pilot pro- 
grams to evaluate the effects of electronic media coverage on the judicial proc- 
ess.97 The pilot programs have been limited to civil proceedings.98 
	  
C. Lack of Uniformity among Rules, States, & Judges 
	  
Federal and state courts lack uniformity as to how to apply current electronic 
media rules to changing technology. The rules governing the use of smart- 
phones, tablets, and other small computers vary greatly by state and judge.99 
The Supreme Court’s role in shaping First Amendment right of access doctrine 
has been “forceful, yet short-lived.”100 Since the Press-Enterprise II decision in 
1986, the Court has left the right of access issues to the lower courts to re- 
solve.101 Many lower courts have considerably expanded the right of access to 
nearly all aspects of both civil and criminal proceedings, including the accom- 
panying court documents.102 However, the increasing incongruity of laws of 
access continues today.103  At the present time, there are many sources of access 
	  
	  
ana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Missouri, North Carolina, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, 
Rhode Island, Texas, and Virginia. Id. 
94 Id. at 8. As of the time of Utah’s report, the Tier 3 states, which had the most strin- 
gent camera broadcasting policies, were: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois, Louisiana, 
Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, 
South Dakota, and Utah. Id. 
95 Id. at 10; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 53 (“Except as otherwise provided by a statute or 
these rules, the court must not permit the taking of photographs in the courtroom during 
judicial proceedings or the broadcasting of judicial proceedings form the courtroom.”). 
96 TECHNOLOGY BROUGHT INTO THE COURTROOM, supra note 2, at 10. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Packer, supra note 21, at 583. 
100 Eugene Cerruti, “Dancing in the Courthouse”: The First Amendment Right of Access 
Opens a New Round, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 237, 263 (1995). 
101 Id. 102 Id. 
103 Id. 
 COMMLAW  CONSPECTUS  	  
	  
	  
	  
laws, none of which are “internally settled or externally consistent with one 
another.”104 Such sources include the Supreme Court’s “Experience and Logic” 
test, Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, common law, local 
statutes, and state courtroom rules governing electronic media.105 Judges con- 
fronted with an alleged right of access must enter a “legal minefield”106 of 
clashing yet interconnected laws.107 
Today, there is little evidence to show how judges decide whether to allow 
digital technology in their courtrooms.108 Because so few judicial rulings about 
technology access result in written opinions, the majority of evidence must be 
gathered from news reports.109 Anecdotal evidence suggests that judges use 
many of the traditional arguments cited both in support and opposition to per- 
mitting television in court to support their arguments.110 The arguments used by 
judges to prohibit new technology in the courtroom reason that new forms of 
technology (such as smartphones, tablets, and laptops) are functionally equiva- 
lent to television cameras, and thus carry the same risks.111 Specifically, judges 
worry that like cameras, new technology may: disrupt judicial order and deco- 
rum;112 impede proper fact finding; distract jurors, witnesses, and others;113 cre- 
ate a spectacle out of cases with grotesque facts or a high-profile defendant, 
because the media will appeal to the lowest common denominator if profit- 
	  
	  
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 269–70. The “Experience and Logic” test refers to the Supreme Court’s two- 
prong test of tradition of openness (history) and instrumental utility of access (functionality) 
for the construction of a right of access. Id. at 269. 
106 Id. at 263 (quoting Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Blain, 808 F.2d 395, 399 (5th 
Cir. 1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
107 Id. 
108 Packer, supra note 21, at 584. 
109 Id. For example, in Cook County, Illinois, where gang violence is endemic, a judge 
banned cell phones from the courtroom, because people were using the cell phones to take 
pictures of witnesses and jurors during trial for the purpose of intimidation. John Kass, 
Judge Did Right Thing by Banning Cellphones in Courtrooms, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 25, 2013), 
http://commcns.org/1u3kGoV. 
110 Packer, supra note 21, at 584. Packer observes that some judges who allow smart- 
phones, justify the decision by describing them as less “physically and psychologically in- 
trusive than television.” Id. Alternatively, judges who prohibit smartphones and electronic 
devices rely on the same arguments made against permitting televisions in the courtroom— 
they are a disruption, an impediment to fact finding, and a security risk. Id. 
111 Id. 
112 See, e.g., High Court Justice Weighs in on Tweeting Ban at Hudson Murder Trial, 
CBS CHI. (Apr. 30, 2012, 5:33 AM), http://commcns.org/RRE0XO (“Tweeting takes away 
from the dignity of a courtroom. The judge doesn’t want the trial to turn into a circus.”). 
113 Packer, supra note 21, at 579. Not only do digital devices distract the juror, but the 
devices might also lead to a mistrial when that juror uses them to research aspects of the 
case at hand. See Brian Grow, As Jurors Go Online, U.S. Trials Go Off Track, REUTERS 
(Dec. 8, 2010, 3:23 PM), http://commcns.org/1kXNJY1. 
   	  
	  
	  
	  
able;114 and jeopardize the security of trial participants, including jurors, wit- 
nesses, court staff, and law enforcement officers.115 In contrast, judges’ argu- 
ments in support of new technology in courts center around how social media, 
smartphones, laptops, and tablets are less disruptive than television cameras 
while providing all of the benefits of an open trial (public education, confi- 
dence in the justice system, and outlet for community rage).116 Since the Estes 
decision, judges still remain split over whether new means of digital communi- 
cation have evolved to the point where their presence in courtrooms is no 
longer physically and psychologically disruptive.117 
	  
IV. NEW TECHNOLOGY & NEW 
THREATS 
	  
The new prevalence of electronic portable devices presents a variety of chal- 
lenges for judges and attorneys alike, such as maintaining order and decorum 
in the courtroom, conducting fair hearings for the defendant, and protecting all 
parties from harm and harassment, making it all the more important to set uni- 
form rules. 
	  
A. Recent Cases 
	  
1. Juror Secrecy & Impartiality 
	  
One of the main problems with social media in particular is its impact on ju- 
ror impartiality and secrecy, which can destroy the fairness of proceedings. In 
	  
	  
114 See, e.g., Christo Lassiter, Put the Lens Cap Back on Cameras in the Courtroom: A 
Fair Trial is at Stake, 67 N.Y. ST. B.J. 6, 8, 10 (1995). 
115 Packer, supra note 21, at 584; see also Karen Franklin, ‘Digital Lynch Mob’ Assaults 
Expert Witness in Murder Trial: Is Internet Vigilanteism in Jodi Arias Case a Sign of Things 
to Come?, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Apr. 18, 2013), http://commcns.org/1m2imbB (comment- 
ing on the cyber-bulling and online harassment of a defense expert in the Jodi Arias trial). 
116 Packer, supra note 21, at 584. The loud, noisy cameras in the Estes era do not exist 
anymore, cameras are inconspicuous (an acute concern in Estes was the disruptive physical 
presence of cameras) exists no longer. See Kelli L. Sager & Karen N. Frederiksen, Televis- 
ing the Judicial Branch: In Furtherance of the Public’s First Amendment Rights, 69 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1519, 1542–43 (1996). Further, there is a good argument to be made that using 
Twitter is more akin to note taking than televising. See Adriana C. Cervantes, Will Twitter 
Be Following You in the Courtroom?: Why Reporters Should Be Allowed to Broadcast Dur- 
ing Courtroom Proceedings, 33 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 133, 149 (2010). In Wiscon- 
sin, a special committee recommended cameras in the courtroom due to their educational 
value. See Stacy Blasiola, Say “Cheese!” Cameras and Bloggers in Wisconsin’s Court- 
rooms, 1 REYNOLDS CT. & MEDIA L.J. 197, 199, 200 (2011) (“[T]he committee’s recom- 
mendation was to allow television cameras sparingly and for educational purposes . . . .”). 
117 Packer, supra note 21, at 578, 584. 
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U.S. v. Fumo, the Defendant, Pennsylvania State Senator Vincent Fumo, 
moved for a new trial when a juror posted messages about the trial on Face- 
book and Twitter.118 After Fumo’s motion, the trial court held a hearing to 
question the juror about his Internet activities, social-networking visits, and 
general media usage throughout the trial.119 On review, the appellate court 
agreed with the trial court’s characterization of the posts as “nothing more than 
harmless ramblings having no prejudicial effect” that were “so vague as to be 
virtually meaningless.”120 Furthermore, the appellate court pointed to the fact 
that there was no evidence that the juror had been contacted regarding the posts 
or that he had used media sources aside from Facebook and Twitter in that sin- 
gle posting incident.121 The Third Circuit concluded that although the juror had 
violated the rule against discussing the trial outside of court, he was neverthe- 
less competent and aware of his duties, and there was no evidence that his mis- 
conduct had a prejudicial impact on the Defendant.122 Social media’s effects are 
subtle and difficult to measure, which has made it increasingly difficult for 
defendants to prove juror prejudice. 
	  
2. Jury & Witness Distraction 
	  
Certain judges worry that smartphones and small computers disrupt the pro- 
ceedings, thus distracting jurors and witnesses.123 In the 2012 trial of a man 
accused of murdering the family of singer-actress Jennifer Hudson, an Illinois 
judge banned the use of cell phones after cell phone rings had, on three occa- 
sions, interrupted testimony.124 Prior to the interruption, the judge had permit- 
ted the use of cell phones among journalists.125 However, she restricted cell 
phone use to e-mail, ironically stating that reporters posting to social media 
would be distracting.126 In contrast, during the 2012 trial of Dr. Conrad Murray 
for the involuntary manslaughter of Michael Jackson, a judge permitted tweet- 
ing, and one local news station sent out nearly 1,900 tweets to 3,000 eager fol- 
	  
	  
	  
118 United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 298 (3d Cir. 2011). 
119   Id. at 305–06. 
120 Id. at 306 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 See, e.g., Blasiola, supra note 116, at 206–07 (observing that in an attempt to mini- 
mize disruptions, some reporters assemble media equipment before trial and coordinate with 
other media entities covering the same case). 
124 Michael Tarm, Jennifer Hudson Family Murder Trial: Judge Bans Cellphones from 
Court, HUFFINGTON POST (May 2, 2012, 7:19 PM), http://commcns.org/SmsGDs. 
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lowers.127 
	  
3. Threatening Security 
	  
Perhaps the most compelling argument for banning new digital devices is 
the possible threat to the security of all parties. In U.S. v. Moussaoui, the judge, 
presiding over the criminal trial of an Al-Qaeda member accused of executing 
the September 11th attacks, refused to allow cameras in the courtroom.128 The 
judge disagreed with Court TV, the intervenor, that “allowing the public to 
participate through the lens of the television camera will serve as a check on 
the judicial process.”129 The judge distinguished attending a trial (which leaves 
spectators with memories of the witness) from television broadcasting (which 
records and distributes the faces of the witnesses).130 The recordation and 
transmittal of the faces of witnesses and of law enforcement officers would 
present a serious threat to their individual safety.131 
The Court also pointed to the effect on juror safety and raised concerns 
about the temptation of jurors to render a “popular verdict.”132 Finally, the 
judge rejected the idea to mask the faces of witnesses and jurors for several 
key reasons. First, he said it created an additional complication in what was 
already a complex case.133 Second, in the case of a mistake, a witness’s identity 
could be exposed to Al-Qaeda, a worldwide terrorist network.134 Third, the 
faces of attorneys, security officers, and court staff would be revealed, as 
would the physical layout of the courtroom, which could lead to a variety of 
long-term security issues.135 Furthermore, a retrial of such a highly publicized 
trial would be extremely difficult.136 And lastly, the worldwide broadcasting of 
the trial would be an “open invitation to any trial participant to engage in 
showmanship or make a public spectacle for the world to see or hear.”137 When 
he denied the media access to the proceedings, the judge in Moussaoui 
overcame arguments that the public’s interest in the trial was significant, 
	  
	  
	  
127 Bruce Carton, Is Tweeting from the Courtroom by Reporters Too Distracting for Ju- 
rors?, LEGAL BLOG WATCH (April 6, 2012, 4:21 PM), http://commcns.org/1tymFPT. 
128 United States v. Moussaoui, 205 F.R.D. 183, 184 (E.D. Va. 2002). 
129 Id. at 186. 
130   Id. at 186–87. 
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132 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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that they needed retribution, and that it would be educated by the proceedings.138 
	  
V. DIFFERING JUDGES’ INTERPRETATIONS OVER HOW TO APPLY 
FEDERAL RULE 53 OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE TO “TWITTER” 
	  
The Supreme Court has yet to address directly what technology the public 
and the media may bring with them to court.139 The Court has stated that the 
First Amendment right of access by the press is not superior to that of the pub- 
lic.140 Therefore, while the First Amendment guarantees that journalists may 
attend, listen, and report on judicial proceedings, this right does not extend to 
the right to televise, record, and broadcast trials.141 In addition, while the Sixth 
Amendment requires that a trial be public, this right is fulfilled by opening the 
doors to the public and press; it does not require that the trial “be broadcast live 
or on tape to the public.”142 Without the Supreme Court’s guidance, some fed- 
eral courts have used Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to 
ban cameras, recording devices, and social media.143 In contrast, other federal 
courts have embraced modern technology with open arms. 
One social media platform, Twitter, has been front and center in at least two 
federal district courtrooms over the past few years.144 Twitter is a free microb- 
logging network that allows users to instantly share small bits of information 
called “tweets.”145 Tweets contain videos, photos, or text of 140 characters or 
less and are shared via mobile message, instant message, or over the Internet in 
real time.146 Twitter accounts can be linked to websites, blogs, social network- 
ing sites, and other electronic platforms with wide audiences.147 The two judges 
in these cases both faced the same question: “Should members of the press be 
allowed to report on federal criminal trials directly from the courtroom via 
Twitter?”148 However, after applying two different rules of Federal Criminal 
Procedure, the judges came to contradictory conclusions.149 
	  
	  
	  
138 Id. at 188. 
139 Packer, supra note 21, at 577. 
140 Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978). 
141 United States v. Hastings, 695 F.2d 1278, 1280 (11th Cir. 1983). 
142 Nixon, 435 U.S. at 610. 
143 Packer, supra note 21, at 577, 585. 
144 Jacob E. Dean, To Tweet or Not to Tweet: Twitter, “Broadcasting,” and Federal Rule 
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145 See generally TWITTER, http://commcns.org/1jIScce (last visited Feb. 18, 2014). 
146 Dean, supra note 144, at 769. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 770. 
149 Id. 
   	  
	  
	  
	  
A. U.S. v. Shelnutt and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 53 
	  
In U.S. v. Shelnutt, the judge defined “broadcast” literally to deny a newspa- 
per reporter’s request to use a “handheld electronic device (e.g., a BlackBerry 
or cellular telephone)” to tweet during a criminal trial.150 The Shelnutt defen- 
dant objected to the request.151 The Shelnutt judge determined that tweeting 
during a trial was a form of “broadcasting,” and thus prohibited under Rule 53 
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.152 According to Rule 53, “[T]he 
court must not permit the taking of photographs in the courtroom during judi- 
cial proceedings or the broadcasting of judicial proceedings from the court- 
room.”153 The Shelnutt judge considered it significant that Rule 53 had been 
amended in 2002 by removing the word “radio” from “radio broadcasting,” as 
that Rule 53 applied to “broadcasting.”154 Citing the Advisory Committee’s 
notes to Rule 53, Judge Land noted that the 2002 change was a purposeful ex- 
pansion meant to sweep additional types of broadcasting under Rule 53.155 
Judge Land relied on the expansive definition of “broadcasting” given in 
Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary,156 although “broadcasting” could be interpreted 
narrowly to apply only to the dissemination of information through television 
or radio.157 Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary defines “broadcasting” as “the cast- 
ing or scattering in all directions” and “the act of making widely known.”158 
According to Judge Land, Twitter clearly fell within the expansive defini- 
tion.159 Judge Land was also concerned about the instantaneous nature of Twit- 
ter, where electronic messages about the trial proceedings are immediately 
communicated to a broad audience.160 Finally, Judge Land pointed out that al- 
though Rule 53 restricts broadcast coverage of federal criminal proceedings, 
the press and public still had a First Amendment right of access to attend, lis- 
ten, and report on criminal trials.161 Citing U.S. v. Hastings, Judge Land made 
the important distinction between the First Amendment right to attend and ob- 
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serve, as opposed to the right to broadcast or publish from trial.162 Therefore, 
the requestor did not have a First Amendment right to tweet during the crimi- 
nal proceedings.163 
Although Judge Land ultimately denied the request to tweet from the court- 
room, the Court did offer a “media room” to members of the press.164 The me- 
dia room was located near the courtroom door and served as a place for jour- 
nalists to report on trial proceedings near but outside the courtroom.165 
The Shelnutt case is instructional, because it demonstrates that the rules 
governing electronic media are vague and fail to provide adequate guidance to 
the courts. It will be extremely important to use precise terms in lieu of those 
such as “broadcasting,” which has multiple definitions and is subject to various 
interpretations. Another challenge raised by smartphones and social media ap- 
plications is that they can be used in many different ways. A smartphone, for 
instance, can be used to make phone calls, send text messages, post to social 
media sites, record videos, take photographs, and correspond by e-mail. Simi- 
larly, Twitter allows a user to send “tweets” through various media such as 
videos, photos, or text.166 Therefore, a judge deciding whether to restrict Twit- 
ter coverage must decide whether Twitter should be entirely prohibited, or only 
certain types of “tweets.” To categorically prohibit tweets, the judge would 
need to distinguish which types are “functionally equivalent” to broadcasting 
and therefore subject to restriction. 
	  
B. U.S. v. Campbell & Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 57(b) 
	  
In contrast, District Court of Kansas Judge Thomas Marten permitted a 
Wichita Eagle reporter to tweet live from court during the trial of six Crips 
gang members charged with racketeering.167 Judge Marten relied on Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 57(b), which governs the procedure to be used in 
District Court in the absence of a controlling law and grants a judge broad dis- 
cretion over his courtroom.168 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 57(b) states, 
in part, that “[a] judge may regulate practice in any manner consistent with 
federal law, these rules, and the local rules of the district.”169   Online streaming 
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is still a very unusual practice in federal court, particularly in criminal cases.170 
However, federal judges retain wide discretion in determining whether to per- 
mit emerging online technology in their courtroom and to dictate how such 
technology may be used.171 Proponents of Twitter say it is equivalent to more 
traditional means of reporting, and that it helps to improve transparency and 
public access to courts.172 Echoing these arguments, Judge Marten stated, “The 
more we can do to open the process to the public, the greater the public under- 
standing - the more legitimacy the public system will have in the eyes of the 
public . . . .”173 
The counter argument is that the danger of social media, particularly in the 
context of this case, greatly outweighed any benefit to the public. The case 
involved multiple co-defendant gang members who faced a variety of assault, 
murder, and drug charges. Twitter coverage allowed instant dissemination of 
the proceedings to a wide audience and arguably posed a grave safety risk to 
witnesses, who faced possible gang retaliation. It is worth noting that many of 
the reporter’s tweets focused specifically on witnesses.174 For example, 
Sylvester tweeted, “Judge Marten is talking to [sic] reluctant witness in cham- 
bers with a court reporter transcribing the conversation,” and that “[t]he wit- 
ness who was yelling in the hallway earlier has not returned to the court- 
house.”175      
Among those who followed Sylvester’s Twitter posts was the father of one 
of the defendants, who lived out of state and was unable to attend the trial.176 
On one hand, providing real-time access to a member of the defendant’s 
family is a strong justification for allowing Twitter in court. A criminal trial is 
a high stakes endeavor whose outcome may separate family members for an 
indefinite period of time. Live broadcasting is one way that relatives, 
friends, and other members of the public can be assured that the trial is con- 
ducted fairly. On the other hand, there is always a potential risk that interested 
	  
170 As Witnesses Sing, Journo’s Twitter Tweets, supra note 167. 
171 Id. Recent examples of technology being allowed in federal courts include: (1) a 
Massachusetts federal judge granted a request in January 2009 for online streaming of a 
recording industry lawsuit filed against a Boston University student accused of illegally 
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parties (such as gang members) will use readily accessible trial information to 
deliberately cause harm and interfere with the judicial process. 
	  
C. The Jerry Sandusky Case 
	  
The high-profile Jerry Sandusky criminal trial177 represents yet another ex- 
ample illustrating a judge’s confusion over whether or not “tweeting” consti- 
tutes broadcasting. In the Sandusky trial, Judge John M. Cleland issued a De- 
corum Order that allowed credentialed members of the media to text or tweet 
from the courtroom using cell phones, laptops, or other electronic devices, with 
the stipulation that press members could not take or transmit photographs, or 
record or broadcast a verbatim account of the proceedings.178 Members of the 
public, however, were not permitted to possess cell phones, laptops, smart- 
phones, or any other comparable electronic device.179 
According to Judge Cleland, this Decorum Order was allowed under Penn- 
sylvania Criminal Procedure Rule 112180 and Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 
3, because texting and tweeting are distinct from “broadcasting.”181 Judge Cle- 
land rejected a plain language definition of broadcasting and instead used a 
contextual interpretation of Rule 112 and Canon 3.182 Judge Cleland believed 
that broadcasting was “the simultaneous transmission of a verbatim account of 
the proceeding” and, therefore, tweeting or texting was permissible so long as 
the communication did not include a verbatim account.183 
In June 2012, Judge Cleland rescinded the portion of the Decorum Order 
that allowed for texting and tweeting.184  Judge Cleland reasoned that his order 
	  
177 Penn State: Full Coverage, DAILY BEAST, http://commcns.org/1tymILF (last visited 
Feb. 19, 2014). 
178 Decorum Order Governing Jury Selection and Trial at 3–4, Pennsylvania v. San- 
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in May was confusing to reporters, and he cited a report stating that tweeting 
and blogging from the courtroom were prohibited by Rule 112.185 Therefore, 
for the high-profile Sandusky criminal trial, reporters were allowed to possess 
and use electronic devices as “tools of the trade,” but were not allowed to use 
electronic devices to transmit any type of communication from the court- 
room.186 
	  
VI. ANALYSIS OF UTAH AND KANSAS’ ELECTRONIC MEDIA RULE 
AMENDMENTS 
	  
A. Rationale for 2012 Electronic Media Courtroom Rule Amendments 
	  
1. Kansas 
	  
The preface to Kansas’ new rules articulates the attempt by the drafters to 
balance the integrity of the judicial process with the free flow of information.187 
On one hand, the electronic devices present a unique test to the court’s con- 
cerns over the dignity, security, and distraction of participants during a trial.188 
On the other hand, electronic communication devices are “redefining the news 
media, the informational product disseminated, and the timeliness of the con- 
tent.”189 The new media policies must recognize that such devices have become 
an essential tool for court observers, participants, and members of the media.190 
Therefore, policies should be flexible enough to utilize the increased access 
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and transparency made possible through electronic devices.191 
	  
2. Utah 
	  
The intent of Utah’s rules, to establish uniformity for electronic media cov- 
erage and to permit electronic coverage while balancing concerns over fair trial 
rights, personal privacy, safety, security, and other legitimate interests, are very 
similar to those of Kansas.192 The impact of Utah’s amended rules was ex- 
tremely significant, in that the state’s media rules, once among the most re- 
strictive, became some of the most liberal in the nation.193 
	  
B. Utah’s Judicial Council Committee & Pilot Program 
	  
In order to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of expanding media 
coverage in trial courtrooms, Utah established a Judicial Council Committee 
composed of judges, attorneys, and court staff.194 The Committee studied the 
impact of technology in courtrooms and oversaw a camera pilot program in 
Davis County, Utah.195 Based on their evaluation of the Davis County Pilot 
Program, as well as the empirical research and experience of other state stud- 
ies, the Committee concluded, “The results from the state studies were unani- 
mous: electronic media coverage of courtroom proceedings—whether civil or 
criminal—has no detrimental impact on parties, jurors, counsel, or courtroom 
decorum. . . . [T]he state studies revealed that fears about witness distraction, 
nervousness, distortion, fear of harm, and reluctance to testify were un- 
founded.”196 The Committee also said that similar federal pilot programs had 
yielded similarly positive results as well.197 Finally, the Committee found that 
electronic media coverage of proceedings serves a significant educational and 
informational benefit to the public.198 
	  
C. Flaws of the State and Federal Pilot Programs 
	  
There are a variety of problems with using the results of state and federal pi- 
lot programs to justify an expansion in coverage to all types of technologies. 
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Perhaps the strongest argument against these studies is that they only evaluate 
the effects of television recording and broadcasting on a trial.199 Laptops, 
smartphones, and tablets are fundamentally different than television cameras. 
Unlike television cameras, newer devices are discrete, easy to conceal, and 
multi-functional. The newer devices can instantly disseminate information 
through a variety of platforms. Therefore, the positive benefits derived from 
television recording should not be used to justify a blanket allowance of all 
other technologies. Courts are generally reluctant to apply old legislation to 
new technologies.200 If courts wish to measure the impact of Twitter, laptops, 
and other portable electronic devices, the courts should design separate pilot 
programs for each type of technology. 
Furthermore, the methodology of most of the pilot programs contains 
many fundamental flaws. First, the short length of such programs (which gen- 
erally range from one to three years) and diversity of cases makes it difficult to 
obtain a representative sample, collect accurate data, and generalize accurately 
about the results. Furthermore, the evaluation design of many programs is de- 
fective. For example, the 1994 Federal Camera Pilot Program measured the 
perceived (rather than actual) effects of cameras on jurors, witnesses, counsel, 
and judges through questionnaires and interviews with judges, attorneys, and 
members of the media.201 The study included no objective comparison of the 
behavior and perceptions of jurors in two test groups: those with electronic 
media and those without such media.202 Therefore, there was no non-media 
group to compare to the experimental group. 
Furthermore, the studies did not directly measure the attitudes of jurors, wit- 
nesses, or parties “because most have had little courtroom experience and 
could not, we believed, make judgments (as judges and attorneys could) about 
the effects of electronic media on themselves.”203 Therefore, the studies gauged 
the responses of attorneys and judges, but omitted the equally vital opinions of 
defendants, witnesses, jurors, and other trial participants. In addition, as fre- 
quently acknowledged by social scientists, self-reporting questionnaires are 
often highly unreliable. Furthermore, the pilot courts were chosen from courts 
where judges volunteered to participate and most of the study’s analyses fo- 
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cused on judges who had experience with electronic media coverage.204 There- 
fore, it is to be expected that those judges would tend to be more favorable to- 
ward electronic coverage than would a sample of judges selected at random.205 
Although the pilot program’s coverage was limited to civil proceedings, its 
findings were so general that the findings arguably extended to criminal pro- 
ceedings.206 
	  
D. Findings that Undermine the Positive Benefits of Camera Coverage 
	  
The 1994 Federal Judicial Study revealed that stories did a poor job of pro- 
viding viewers with detail about the legal process.207 This severely undermines 
the “educational benefit” justification normally given for allowing such tech- 
nology in courts. Additionally, plaintiffs and their attorneys received more “air 
time” than defendants and their attorneys.208 The lack of balance in covering 
the parties of litigation could present a biased, incomplete account of the trial. 
Finally, the lack of a control group severely undermined the credibility of the 
study’s data. One study that compared the effects of traditional and electronic 
media coverage on mock witnesses and jurors found that witnesses who were 
subjected to electronic media coverage reported being distracted and “some- 
what uncomfortable” about the media presence.209 
Other states’ studies contain equally concerning statistics about the negative 
impact of cameras on trial participants. For example, a New York pilot pro- 
gram and study found that 33% of witnesses interviewed did not have a favor- 
able view of such coverage.210 In addition, 37% of attorneys reported that the 
atmosphere in the courtroom was tense as a result of video coverage, and 38% 
of attorneys stated that the testimony of witnesses was affected by coverage.211 
Almost half of the attorneys surveyed believed that the audio-visual coverage 
negatively affected the fairness of trial.212 Finally, judges and members of the 
public expressed strong concerns about the educational benefits, nature of cov- 
erage, the effect on witnesses, fair trial implications, and impact on privacy of 
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cameras in the courtroom.213 
	  
E. Shortcomings of Amended KS and UT Rules 
	  
The amended Kansas rules provide a positive step in that they not only clar- 
ify what types of technological devices are allowed in courtrooms, but more 
significantly, how those devices must be used. Kansas and Utah should be 
commended for leading the movement to include emerging technology in their 
court rules, which will lead to more uniformity and predictability across court- 
rooms. However, while offering a step in the right direction, both rules include 
shortcomings that should be addressed by future states revising their courtroom 
rules. 
	  
1. Vagueness over the Applicability of Rules/Ineffective Enforcement Proce- 
dure for Rule Violations 
	  
i. Applicability of Rules 
	  
The media coverage rules in Kansas apply in “all cases to a judicial district 
or court issuing specific orders, local rules, or guidelines for the use of elec- 
tronic devices in judicial proceedings.”214 Utah’s rules are equally broad, with 
applicability “to the courts of record and not of record” and govern electronic 
coverage of “proceedings that are open to the public.”215 The Kansas and Utah 
rules could be improved by specifying which stages and types of trials, if any, 
are presumptively barred from coverage. The larger problem with the rules is 
that both states have equated the right of access with the right to broadcast, an 
argument that the Supreme Court explicitly rejected in Nixon v. Warner Com- 
munications.216 
	  
ii. Permitted and Prohibited Uses of Electronic Devices 
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Kansas’s rules take the unusual (but highly important step) of not only clari- 
fying what devices are permitted, but also how such devices must be used.217 
Although devices are allowed in court, the use of those devices is extremely 
limited.218 Considering the extensive restrictions on devices, it is difficult to 
understand why courtroom observers are allowed to bring electronic devices 
into the Kansas courtrooms in the first place. The burden placed on the partici- 
pants to the legal proceedings to ensure that the prohibitions are enforced 
would likely present a significant challenge—smartphones are discrete devices 
with a panoply of functions. Additionally, the Kansas rules specify the prohib- 
ited uses of electronic devices, but do not give a clear procedure for their en- 
forcement.219 Court Martials can likely handle blatant violations of the rule dur- 
ing trial proceedings. However, a court observer who subtly takes a picture or 
video of the proceeding poses a risk more difficult to discern and enforce.220 
	  
iii. Rule Violations and Punishments 
	  
The “punishment” for violating Kansas’ rule, that one’s electronic device 
“may be confiscated”221 lacks the strong deterrence value that should necessar- 
ily accompany such a broad liberalization of the electronic device policy. The 
clarity and strong deterrence value of Utah’s punishments render them far su- 
perior. The Utah rules state that those who violate electronic media rules or 
court orders may be held in contempt of court, sanctioned by law, or removed 
from the proceeding, and that the judge may terminate or suspend electronic 
media coverage.222 Opening the court to modern technology may greatly im- 
prove public access and judicial transparency. At the same time, liberal elec- 
tronic media policies may be severely abused. To counteract the inherent risks 
of electronic media access, punishments must be straightforward, simple to 
apply, and stringent enough to deter potential rule violations. Additionally, 
judges must have a range of punishments at their disposal to deal with infrac- 
tions that vary in severity. 
	  
iv. News media 
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The Kansas rule allows the judge to make an exception for “the news and 
educational media and others—such as a publisher, editor, reporter, or other 
person . . . who gathers, receives, or processes information for communication 
to the public, or an online journal in the regular business of newsgathering and 
disseminating news or information to the public . . . .”223 The Kansas rules 
specify that electronic communications may only be used for purposes of edu- 
cation or news dissemination.224 Additionally, the ability to photograph, record, 
or broadcast live from court is limited to those who obtain prior permission 
from the court.225 Court observers are presumably not included in the rule, and 
journalists who do obtain the court’s permission are treated as an “exception” 
to the general prohibition against using electronic devices in court.226 In 
contrast, Utah’s rules broadly define “news reporter” as: 
[A]ny person who gathers, records, photographs, reports, or publishes in- 
formation for the primary purpose of disseminating news and information to 
the public, and any newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication, press 
association or wire service, radio station, television station, satellite broadcast, 
cable system, or other organization with whom that person is connected.227 
Attorney Jeff Hunt, a member of the Judicial Committee who crafted the 
new rule explained, “The language in the rule defining a news reporter is quite 
broad, and we drafted it that way intentionally . . . It includes any person who 
is gathering information for dissemination to the public. You don’t have to be 
connected to or employed by a traditional media outlet.”228 
Kansas’ and Utah’s definitions of the “media” are both problematic in 
scope. By limiting its definition of “media” to traditional journalists, Kansas’ 
rules exclude unconventional journalists and other members of the public from 
contributing to the marketplace of ideas. In addition, the Supreme Court has 
explicitly said that the rights of the media should not exceed those of the gen- 
eral public.229 
However, Utah’s broad definition of “media” is problematic. The failure of 
Utah’s rule to categorize different types of journalists could pose a problem, 
because members of the media may vary tremendously in their methods, work 
products, and audiences. Utah’s definition is so expansive that the rule seem- 
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ingly extends to citizen bloggers and anyone else with a large online following. 
Sifting through the (possible) flood of competing requests to broadcast might 
unduly burden the judge. Because many individuals would qualify under the 
new rules, it could become difficult for the judge to distinguish between the 
“news media” and members of the public. Non-traditional journalists might be 
uninterested in providing full and fair coverage of the proceedings. Conse- 
quently, the reporting of the trial could be biased, unbalanced, and inaccurate. 
All journalists (and members of the public) who wish to broadcast should be 
subject to a duty of fair reporting. 
	  
v. Judicial Autonomy 
	  
Even more troubling is that Utah’s rules state that “there is a presump- 
tion that electronic media coverage by a news reporter shall be permitted in 
public proceedings. The judge may prohibit or restrict electronic media cover- 
age only if the judge finds that the reasons for doing so are sufficiently com- 
pelling to outweigh the presumption.”230 Such a broadly stated rule creates a 
dangerous precedent that threatens judicial autonomy. It is the job of a judge to 
control what occurs in his courtroom, and such authority should necessarily 
include the case-by-case discretion of whether to permit coverage. 
Rather than discouraging judges from restricting coverage, the Kansas rule 
better protects the judge’s right to control his courtroom, and states “the privi- 
lege granted by this rule does not limit or restrict the judge’s power, authority, 
or responsibility to control the proceedings before the judge.”231 Further, the 
judge can remove all electronic devices from the courtroom, including the de- 
vices held by those persons with the privilege.232 In Gannett Co. v. De- 
Pasquale, the Supreme Court stated that “[O]ur cases have uniformly recog- 
nized the public-trial guarantee as one created for the benefit of the defen- 
dant.”233 Giving “news reporters” presumptive coverage forces the court to ac- 
commodate the needs of the media and general public, rather than prioritizing 
the rights of the defendant and others who have a legitimate stake in the out- 
come of the litigation. 
Utah’s rule also does not provide sufficient guidance to judges to help them 
in deciding whether to prohibit or restrict coverage. The rule requires judges to 
consider “some or all” of nine factors when determining whether the presump- 
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tion of electronic coverage has been overcome and should be prohibited or re- 
stricted. Offering a list of specific factors to aid judges in their decision- 
making is positive step. However, the rule is still ambiguous, in that it does not 
state how judges must weigh these factors in their determination of whether or 
not to limit or prohibit coverage. A stronger proposal would be to shorten the 
list of factors or provide particularized circumstances that trigger a restriction 
of coverage. 
	  
F. Burden on Courts and Other Logistical Considerations 
	  
One of the most compelling arguments against allowing extensive coverage 
and expanding the use of technology in courtrooms is the enormous burden 
required to coordinate judges, media personnel, and court staff. Both the Kan- 
sas and Utah rules specify a variety of detailed protocol and procedures that 
must be followed by members of the media reporting from trial. For example, 
the Kansas rules state that members of the media must request permission at 
least a week in advance, although the judge may “waive this requirement for 
good cause.”234 The Utah rules are even less restrictive, and allow a “news re- 
porter” to request written permission as late as one business day before the 
proceeding is scheduled. Such a rule places the court at the whim of the media, 
who may seek last minute requests to report on the eve of high-profile trials. 
High profile trials that capture the public’s attention may be more likely to be 
the targets of exaggerated, distorted, and inflammatory reporting. Furthermore, 
because modern technology and the boom of Internet sources offers hundreds 
of new online platforms, such prejudicial publicity may go largely undetected 
by the judge. 
Kansas and Utah have different procedures for handling requests from the 
media, pool arrangements, and other logistical concerns. In Kansas, the chief 
judge must assign a coordinator or other court employee to handle to serve as 
an intermediary between judges, media, and others making a request under the 
rule. Utah, on the other hand, lessens the costs borne by courts and preserves 
judicial efficiency by making it the duty of reporters (rather than the court) to 
designate a media representative and to organize pooling arrangements. The 
detailed logistical considerations of the Utah and Kansas rules over pooling 
arrangements, lighting, equipment, and media coordination are meant to 
streamline electronic media coverage, but in practice such coordination may 
prove laborious and time-consuming. North Carolina and Virginia both offer a 
simple and effective solution: the broadcasting associations in their respective 
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states must designate one person to represent each media industry (i.e., televi- 
sion media, radio broadcasters, and photographers). Such representatives are 
the only persons authorized to speak for the media to the presiding judge and 
are responsible for negotiating with court officials. 
But perhaps the biggest risk of the new rules is that journalists may provide 
real-time coverage from trial. The instantaneous nature of such broadcasting 
creates a danger that a minor’s name, juror’s face, or inaccurate account can be 
disseminated to a broad audience and the damage can be impossible to undo. 
In Kansas, for example, a judge declared a mistrial after a reporter tweeted a 
photo containing the profile of a juror, an express violation of the Kansas me- 
dia rules.235 Live broadcasting also strips trial participants (such as the defen- 
dant) of the opportunity to object to potentially prejudicial parts of trial (such 
as being led in to courtroom in restraints) before the coverage is widely broad- 
cast. Parties are left with the unappealing task of proving the negative impact 
of coverage on the outcome of the trial after an unfavorable verdict has been 
rendered. 
In Massachusetts, a pilot program called OpenCourt offers several innova- 
tive improvements to help solve some of these logistical challenges.236 One 
important improvement is that recorded coverage is delayed, which allows 
judges a chance to review the coverage and gives parties a chance to object.237 
In addition, judges have a “toggle switch” on the bench, which allows them to 
block audio and video coverage for certain parts of trial, such as the testimony 
of a particular witness.238 
	  
VII. PROPOSED 
SOLUTION 
	  
A. Need for Uniformity 
	  
During the past several decades, technology has changed and evolved at an 
unprecedented rate. Whereas the debate over technology in court once re- 
volved around video cameras, the discussion has now shifted to smartphones, 
laptops, and social media. The rules governing electronic media vary signifi- 
cantly by state and judge. While the Supreme Court tacitly approved state ex- 
perimentation with cameras in Chandler, the Court has yet to prescribe the 
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specificity needed to guide state and federal courts. A uniform set of rules that 
transcends state lines would lead to more just, equitable, and efficient judicial 
outcomes. 
	  
B. Goals of a Uniform Law 
	  
A proposed uniform law should have several goals. First, it should clearly 
define terms such as “reporter,” “broadcast,” and most importantly, “electronic 
media” to prevent confusion and differing interpretations among judges. The 
rules should expressly state not only what types of devices are permitted, but 
also how these devices must be used. Second, while a proposed uniform law 
should be specific enough to eliminate confusion, it must also be flexible 
enough to account for the rapid pace at which technology evolves, and be able 
to accommodate advances that have not yet occurred. Third, the rule should 
offer a balance of discretionary and bright-line policies for judges to guide 
their decision-making and preserve their autonomy over their own courtrooms. 
One proposal is to emulate the “tiers” of state restrictiveness and provide spe- 
cific factors tied to levels of presumption (i.e., a presumption in favor of com- 
plete media coverage, partial media coverage, or against media coverage). For 
example, if the case involves a minor victim, sexual-assault victim, or a defen- 
dant with a history of violence, the presumption would be against media cover- 
age. To overcome a presumption against coverage, the burden would be on the 
media to prove that electronic media coverage would not compromise the 
safety or fairness of proceedings. 
	  
C. Logistical  Considerations 
	  
New electronic media rules should streamline permission forms and proce- 
dures to make coordination between court and media personnel as easy as pos- 
sible. Georgia state courts, for example, have adopted the same form for all 
those who wish to request permission to broadcast from trial.239 Other innova- 
tive new media policies include those in North Carolina and Virginia, where 
one media representative is designated for each industry.240 These policies en- 
sure efficiency, in that judges only communicate and negotiate with a select 
few designated and credentialed individuals. Finally, new electronic policies 
must contain clear punishments to deter violations of the rule and to preserve 
judicial decorum. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
	  
While Utah and Kansas’ amended rules offer a step in the right direction, 
they also unfairly skew the right of access in favor of the public and overlook 
the equally vital interests of trial participants. New rule policies must over- 
come this shortcoming by clearly stipulating rules and sanctions, streamlining 
forms and procedures, defining statutory terms, specifying which electronic 
devices are permitted, mandating how such devices must be used, and clarify- 
ing how judges must weigh the competing constitutional rights of trial partici- 
pants. As new technologies continue to infiltrate the courtroom, legislatures 
must take steps to ensure that the safety, security, and decorum of proceedings 
are preserved while at the same time respecting the press and public’s interest 
in the free flow of information. 
